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NO. 35 JULY 2020 Introduction 
Connectivity and Geopolitics: Beware 
the “New Wine in Old Bottles” Approach 
Nadine Godehardt and Karoline Postel-Vinay 
With the Covid-19 pandemic, the fragility and vulnerability of the liberal international 
order became globally visible in an instant. Aspects of everyday life and especially our 
taken-for-granted views of connectedness have been disrupted in Asia, Europe, and 
beyond. The pandemic and, more importantly, the political reactions to it, in many 
ways again underpin the geopolitical significance of connectivity in world politics. 
This link between geopolitics and connectivity becomes most obvious in a couple of 
successive initiatives in East Asia and the EU that illustrate the geopolitical turn of 
connectivity politics in the last decade. What different actors mean by connectivity 
matters more than ever; getting to the bottom of those meanings gives insights about 
what geopolitics contains today. 
 
As rival projects of connectivity development 
were being deployed within and beyond 
Asia, the expression “geopolitics of connec-
tivity” started to appear here and there. 
This expression carries the appeal of mixing 
the exciting new with the familiar old: the 
novelty of the latest global buzzword that 
is “connectivity” and the déjà-vu of a Cold 
War–type geopolitical confrontation. This 
classic understanding of geopolitics builds 
on constant, static, and objective geograph-
ical representations that determine political 
practices – also often referred to as “geo-
determinism.” Along with the geographic 
location of a state, the beneficial distribu-
tion of power resources is determinative 
of the global status of a state. One could be 
tempted to say that the growing competi-
tion for connecting the world is a “new 
wine (connectivity) in old bottles (geopoli-
tics)” situation. But that is clearly mislead-
ing. Connectivity is not new. Rather, it cov-
ers a range of meanings and uses by various 
actors that tend to be overlooked or over-
simplified. Geopolitics triggered by connec-
tivity in the context of China’s rise is not a 
classic balance-of-power game that is being 
somehow recycled. What is at stake with 
the competition for connectivity – because 
of the very nature of connectedness – is a 
new type of geopolitics in which the “geo,” 
thus the “political space,” has been largely 
redefined. The new play of connectivity 
geopolitics brings about an uncertainty that 
can be disturbing. In that sense, the refer-
ence to the “new wine, old bottles” situa-
tion might provide a form of cognitive 
solace. Yet, it entails a risk that is not just 
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a conceptual shortcoming but, more to 
the point, a real political risk, especially 
in the current tense global context. 
Connectivity, Geopolitics, and the 
Future of International Order 
The practice of connectivity itself is as old 
as human interactions. What is novel is 
the emergence of connectivity as a strategy 
with geopolitical implications. Yet, the 
nature of these geopolitical outcomes needs 
to be assessed in a context of transition 
where the liberal international order that 
predominately shaped global cooperation 
during the last decades is being increasingly 
contested. Even before the Covid-19 pan-
demic, debates about the liberal international 
order’s future were dominated by a growing 
disorientation in politics, economics, as 
well as academia, creating a confusion that 
was displayed by a lack of words, concepts, 
and ideas to describe the ongoing transfor-
mation in world politics. The Covid-19 crisis 
has amplified the perception that the inter-
national order has indubitably entered an 
“interregnum” whereby, in Antonio Gram-
sci’s words, “the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born.” 
The global health crisis has furthermore 
illuminated paradoxes that had been con-
cealed by some commonly shared assump-
tions about the liberal international order, 
globalization, and connectedness. All bor-
der controls, travel and mobility restric-
tions, as well as digital tracing systems were 
implemented by democratic and non-demo-
cratic governments alike; when global trade 
and supply chains were radically disrupted, 
it became strikingly clear that international 
liberalism does not promote unconditional 
globalization. Rather, it has been shown 
that globalization can trigger simultaneously 
hyper-connectivity and outright dis-connec-
tivity. Hence, what governments and organi-
zations with potentially diverging agendas 
mean by connectivity matters more than 
ever. Analyzing those various meanings of 
connectivity is crucial for making sense of 
the strategies that sustain them and shape 
the geopolitical dynamics at play in the 
emerging new world order. The Covid-19 
shock has triggered debates about whether 
we are facing a cycle of rapid de-globaliza-
tion and how a possible new Cold War be-
tween the US and China might affect it. 
Such speculation is, in our view, mislead-
ing. Connectedness is unavoidable. What 
should be asked, then, is how one defines 
it – and more importantly, whether one 
defines it normatively or not, and how 
exactly it impacts geopolitics. Furthermore, 
whether one considers connectivity to be 
a common good or not, these are key ques-
tions for the future of international order. 
From Random Connections to 
Meaningful Connectivity 
The term connectivity, as we have been 
using it since the late 20th century, comes 
from the field of computing. It was at 
first – and for some still is – a basic notion 
that simply describes a state or a capacity 
of being connected. It has progressively 
encompassed various meanings of connected-
ness in diverse sectors, such as manage-
ment, finance, trade, energy, urbanism, and 
education. Yet, from the meta-perspective 
of human activity, the idea of connectivity 
is above all a fundamental condition. So 
what exactly is new? 
Firstly, and obviously, the intensity, 
scale, and impact of connectivity in the 
early 21st century make it qualitatively dif-
ferent from previous states of connected-
ness. The digital revolution in particular 
entails a hyper-connectivity that is almost 
of a different nature. It generates an accel-
eration of life and an erosion of known 
boundaries, as the rapidity of high-tech in-
novation processes constantly tests existing 
understandings of power structures, sov-
ereignty, and order. Digital connectivity 
challenges our modes of regulation and 
governance at all levels, and it radically 
reshapes the relation between public space 
and private spheres. In other words, it trans-
forms the conditions in which politics takes 
place. 
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Secondly, the way we are connected 
today has led to what Henry Farrel and 
Abraham L. Newman call “weaponized 
interdependence.” It describes how actors, 
mainly states, make strategic use of eco-
nomic interdependencies and networks 
over which they have control. They also 
share the view that – in a world in which 
everything can become a matter of war – 
global networks (financial, commercial, 
infrastructural, digital, etc.), by increasing 
interdependencies among states, are 
actually enhancing the risk of security 
issues. They point in particular at the 
possibility to use “asymmetric network 
structures and create the potential for 
‘weaponized interdependence,’ in which 
some states are able to leverage inter-
dependent relations to coerce others.” 
The notion of interdependence – very 
similar to connectivity – is twofold in 
meaning. Firstly, referring to the actual 
origin of the term, interdependence was 
introduced by Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye as a conceptual response to 
neorealism, in which hard power deter-
mines the structure of international rela-
tions. Representatives of interdependence, 
however, underline that more connections 
also create more security between states. 
A condition of interdependence is that all 
involved actors accept the overarching 
liberal international order. Secondly, in 
recent years, interdependence has become 
a political term that policy-makers use to 
highlight strategic dependences between 
states. So, it instead emerges as a form of 
friction. “Weaponized interdependence” 
is an academic response to that latter ten-
dency, pointing to the strategic control of 
key linkages and connections by key actors.  
What should then be stressed here is 
that connectivity as strategy is different 
from connections that are built randomly 
or opportunistically. The absence of dis-
tinction between the two often hinders the 
debate about why and how connectivity 
affects international politics. 
Connectivity As Such 
Connectivity as such is represented through 
the operative dimensions of relations – the 
connections – between human communi-
ties by making possible the circulation of 
people and “things” such as goods, diseases, 
knowledge, ideas, beliefs, practices. That 
means that connections do not predefine 
relations between human communities, but 
they can shape them. Building a bridge over 
a river is not a priori a recipe for coopera-
tion, or reversely for conflict, between the 
communities that are connected, but it will 
have an impact on their relations. Likewise, 
the Internet does not, as such, create solidar-
ity or violence, but it gives form to solidary 
or violent relations. The anthropologist 
Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing borrows the term 
“friction” from physics to describe the 
effects of interconnection whose qualities 
are not fixed but unstable, unequal, and 
generally unpredictable. To maintain con-
nections and keep them inclusive, it takes 
work. Since societies cannot survive with-
out some degree of anticipation and regu-
lation, connections, at some point, encoun-
ter policy. 
Connectivity Policies 
Connectivity policies are almost as old 
as connections themselves. From urban 
planning in ancient cities to the infrastruc-
tural development of empires, history has 
shown that organizing and regulating 
connectivity constitute an intrinsic feature 
of governing. Ordering connections is there-
fore a matter of both efficiency and power. 
Yet, for a long time, connectivity policies 
were instead seen as being free from poli-
tics, and mostly as affirmative. Two exam-
ples: First, connectivity policies are clearly 
linked to any type of infrastructure policy. 
Debates about infrastructure projects and 
related standards are usually depoliticized 
and mostly looked at from technical view-
points. 
This leads to the second example. Un-
doubtedly, standardization processes en-
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tailed in connectivity policies could be de-
fined as mostly politics-free by being deter-
mined via technical criteria and motivated 
by a consensual understanding of progress. 
Obviously, this affirmative perspective 
of connectivity policies has been questioned 
from time to time, and then clearly politi-
cized – if we just think of the many protest 
movements related to huge infrastructure 
projects – but seldom, and only in recent 
years, are these places of connectivity seen 
as a crucial matter of geopolitics. Today, the 
spatial aspects of infrastructure and stand-
ards, among other things, are fundamental 
for understanding the new realities of the 
current interregnum of world politics. 
Architect Keller Easterling boils it down to 
the essence: “[I]nfrastructure space becomes 
a medium of what might be called extra-
statecraft – a portmanteau describing the 
often undisclosed activities outside of, in 
addition to, and sometimes even in partner-
ship with statecraft” (emphasis in original). 
In other words, this will transform connec-
tedness as a basic feature of human activity 
into connectivity with purpose or connec-
tivity (geo)politics. 
Three Stages toward the 
Geopoliticization of Connectivity 
Stage one: Improving regionalization 
through connectivity policies 
The link between geopolitics and connec-
tivity policies becomes most obvious in a 
couple of successive initiatives in East Asia 
that illustrate the geopolitical turn of con-
nectivity practices in the last decade. For 
example, the “Master Plan on ASEAN Con-
nectivity,” adopted in 2010 with the aim 
of constituting a new ASEAN Community 
by 2015, was inspired both by a decades-old 
regional vision and more recent issues 
identified by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) in the early 2000s. The 2010 Ha Noi 
Declaration on the Adoption of the Master 
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity presented a 
common ambition to bring peoples, goods, 
services, and capital closer together in 
accordance with the ASEAN Charter. Simi-
lar ambition has been shared in other parts 
of the world and will sound very familiar 
to anyone aware of the history of regional 
integration since 1945. 
The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 
also acknowledges the need to address issues 
linked to uncontrolled, expanding connec-
tivity or, on the contrary, to the lack of 
connectedness, including environmental 
degradation, transnational crime, and un-
equal development. Those problems had 
been discussed in a 2005 joint study of the 
World Bank, the ADB, and the Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation entitled 
“Connecting East Asia: A New Framework 
for Infrastructure.” Taking stock of the 
aftermath of the late 1990s Asian financial 
crisis and the effects of growing, unregulat-
ed urbanization and flows, the study was 
recommending enhanced connectivity 
within the region, not just more but also 
better connectedness. The ASEAN Connec-
tivity scheme, which aims at improving 
regional integration, thus represents an 
example of a “stage one” politicization of 
connectivity, reflecting a long-standing 
liberal narrative of progress. Connectivity 
in this context could still be defined as 
a classic regional integration program. 
Stage two: Defining a new inter-
national space beyond the region 
The connectivity project “One Belt, One 
Road” – launched by Chinese president 
Xi Jinping in 2013 – which, since 2016, is 
officially translated as the “Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI),” appears to pertain to an-
other, new realm of politics with far-reach-
ing global ambitions and an emphasis on 
multidimensional linkages. There are two 
very specific features: first, the multidimen-
sional spatialization of China’s foreign 
policy through the BRI framework. This has 
created a nexus of spatial structures (e.g., 
economic corridors, physical and digital 
ecosystems, transportation hubs, and other 
linkages) and different layers of technolo-
gies (e.g., 5G mobile networks, digital pay-
ment systems, global energy interconnec-
tions, and satellites) that could order the 
world in a different, Chinese-centric way. 
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As Peter Ferdinand evaluates: “[I]f it [BRI] is 
realized in full, it will indeed fundamentally 
transform the geography of global affairs.” 
Second, the Chinese government and a 
multiplicity of other Chinese actors are 
making these places of connectivity a stra-
tegic matter of geopolitics. Their practices 
open the way for new spatial expressions, 
frameworks, and purposes for political co-
operation and development. This, in turn, 
creates a potential for connectivity geo-
politics. In this context, geopolitics very 
much entails how spatial representations 
of the world emerge, change, and become 
or remain popular. 
China’s connectivity politics has thus 
added a spatial, geopolitical meaning to con-
nectivity, which – particularly in times of 
this interregnum of international order – 
disrupts the established liberal views of 
order, norms, standards, as well as devel-
opment and cooperation. 
Stage three: Emulating competition 
in politicized connectivity 
Observers as well as participants in China’s 
connectivity projects have noted that the 
implementation processes of the said proj-
ects reveal a specific pattern of standards- 
and rules-imposition from Chinese actors 
such as Chinese state agencies, the Chinese 
Communist Party, and private actors. The 
unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of 
those standards and rules has been a source 
of frustration and concern, not only for 
stakeholders in Sino-foreign joint projects, 
but also for external parties fearing a chal-
lenge to the global modus operandi for 
cooperation. 
This concern was clearly reflected in 
the wording of Japan’s presentation in May 
2015 of its own connectivity policy plan, 
entitled “Partnership for Quality Infrastruc-
ture: Investment for Asia’s Future,” which 
stressed the importance of quality as an 
international standard that guarantees sus-
tainability and well-being for the people. It 
was likewise expressed in September 2018, 
and even more explicitly, in the EU’s con-
nectivity strategy with Asia, calling for the 
assertion of a European way that promotes 
transparency, respect for common rules, 
a level playing field, as well as comprehen-
sive sustainability. Finally, the launching 
of an EU-Japan “Partnership on Sustainable 
Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure” in 
September 2019 signaled momentum in the 
convergence of liberal powers pushing for 
different, values-based types of connectivity 
policies. 
Unsurprisingly, the successive moves of 
Tokyo and Brussels have been commonly 
interpreted as strategic reactions to the Chi-
nese initiative. Whether this is a matter of 
perception or not, it has undoubtedly in-
augurated a new venue for international 
competition. 
Competing Connectivity Meanings 
The fact that China’s connectivity politics 
has prompted Japan, the EU, and also 
others to design alternative strategies could 
initially be interpreted along the lines of 
classic geopolitics “textbook” considerations: 
the decades of diverging views between 
Japan and China on regionalism; competi-
tion between Europe and China for eco-
nomic influence in third countries; and the 
emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a political 
moniker, which, in Beijing at least, is 
regarded as a US-led containment strategy 
against China, but in academic contexts is 
also discussed as yet another interregional 
response to the BRI. 
These alternative strategies could further 
be understood, especially from a European 
or Western point of view, as the expression 
of a pervasive dread of the actual impact 
of China’s “rise,” and consequently of what 
the future world order might look like. 
Although it looks highly unlikely that the 
reach of the BRI will encompass Europe all 
the way to the Atlantic, its materialization 
through a few projects with some eastern 
and southern European countries is politi-
cally significant. It concurs with a growing 
euro-skepticism, doubts about the robust-
ness of democracy, and distrust about what 
the EU actually or supposedly represents, 
and the subsequent opportunistic search for 
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alternatives. The complex dynamics of fear 
vs. attraction for the “Chinese way” – and 
distrust vs. faith in the European project 
and its underlying norms – is similar to 
a hall of mirrors where one tends to lose 
sight of the issues at stake.  
First and foremost, it is important to re-
member that all governments and regional 
organizations that have been rethinking 
connectivity policies since the beginning of 
the millennium share one basic view: Con-
nectedness, whether national, regional, or 
global, needs to be improved in order to 
address the general problem of growing in-
equalities. Building infrastructure has, for 
decades, been considered a central feature 
of national as well as global development 
policies. But it has not resulted in equal 
development, and there is a greater dis-
crepancy now between those who are con-
nected and those who are not. The expres-
sion “the left-behinds of globalization” 
is the realization that, in developed and 
developing countries alike, connectedness 
has not been evenly distributed. 
Beyond the shared understanding of the 
socio-economic purpose of improved con-
nectivity as an instrument for better inclu-
siveness, the point of divergence between 
China and Japan – and more generally 
between China and liberal powers such as 
the EU and it political allies – is the matter 
of implementation. This, in turn, reflects a 
difference in international projection, and 
eventually the meaning of connectivity. 
This difference is twofold: the space of 
action, and the normative significance of 
the action. 
Space of Action 
As shown in the three stages of the (geo-) 
politicization of connectivity, both the EU 
and Japan, along with ASEAN, have used 
connectivity development as an instrument 
of integration that is focused on the regional 
level, but not beyond. Strikingly, whereas 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) dialogue 
has been established for some time now – 
as was the ASEM Pathfinder Group on Con-
nectivity in 2018, which has focused on 
four “Tangible Areas of Cooperation in the 
Field of Connectivity,” including connectiv-
ity policies, sustainable connectivity, trade 
and investment connectivity, and future 
and digital connectivity – there has been 
very little done in terms of actual connec-
tions between the two regions. More gener-
ally, the EU’s foreign policy thinking tends 
to be region-to-region, as the many inter-
regional partnerships illustrate, and as is 
clearly shown in the wording of the EU 
strategy on “Connecting Europe with Asia.” 
Meanwhile, the BRI has been deconstruct-
ing the regional framework by creating a 
new space for cooperation that is neither 
sub-global nor global in the classic abstract 
sense of the term, but, as described above, 
multidimensional in a very concrete way. 
This spatial reinvention constitutes a sub-
stantial challenge for international actors 
accustomed to cooperation within a frame-
work of neatly defined areas, as in the World 
Bank’s or the UN’s nomenclature, delineat-
ing as many territories for cooperation and 
influence as possible, thus forming a global 
whole. The control over the global scene 
hence becomes even more contested. 
Normative Significance of Action 
Along with its geopoliticization, China has 
transformed connectivity into a synonym 
for people’s material empowerment. In that 
sense, connectivity with Chinese character-
istics becomes a socio-economic path for 
equal prosperity as well as global inclusive-
ness, mostly in contrast to the exclusive 
globalization attributed to the US. By con-
trast, the push by the EU and Japan to build 
values-based connectivity strategies goes 
beyond the material realm and addresses 
ethical issues of transparency, rule of law, 
and a level playing field. 
That the competition of connectivity 
strategies would express itself normatively 
was somewhat predictable. China, particu-
larly under the leadership of Xi, has made 
its problems with Western ideas about con-
stitutional democracy, the universal values 
of human rights, and civil society very clear 
from the start. Domestically, this develop-
ment has been expressed in a number of 
new security-related laws and the expan-
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sion of digital control mechanisms. Exter-
nally, the Chinese strategy is embedded 
in an international discourse system (guoji 
huayutixi) that builds on creating an inclu-
sive, prosperous, and stable global commu-
nity of common destiny (renlei mingyun 
gongtongti). 
What is to be noted then is the discrep-
ancy between China and the liberal powers 
when it comes to framing connectivity 
politically. China presents connectivity as 
a “value” in itself in a way that echoes the 
promotion by illiberal Asian nations (in-
cluding China) of “Asian values” that stress 
harmony and prosperity, and stay clear of 
individual rights. The EU and Japan have 
not yet provided a political framing in which 
connectivity can be equated with liberal 
values. So the EU and Japan have clearly 
acknowledged the value of connectivity 
for development that can be more or less 
shaped normatively, but still fall short of 
considering, and therefore defending, con-
nectivity as a political value in its own right. 
This is an important difference at a time 
when unequal access to connectedness – 
and consequently connectivity and dis-con-
nectivity – is increasingly manifesting 
itself as the positive and negative outcomes 
of globalization. In that respect, China has 
given itself a head start, both in practical 
terms and from a narrative perspective, in 
the global fight against inequalities and the 
search for inclusiveness. 
The competition of meanings and ap-
proaches to connectivity politics often seems 
to take the shape of a war of narratives. 
Here again, China is ahead of its liberal 
competitors by making use of what, in 
Party-speak and scholarly publications, is 
referred to as discourse power (huayuquan). 
The application of this sort of power that – 
in contrast to the Western concept of soft 
power – refers to playing a proactive, con-
structive, and vociferous role on the global 
stage with the long-term goal of gradually 
reshaping the language and structure of 
world politics, is central to China’s connec-
tivity strategy. 
This is all the more remarkable, and 
somewhat paradoxical, considering the fact 
that, in practice, both the EU and Japan 
have far-ranging experience over a longer 
period with “connecting” – Europe itself is 
the most connected region in the world – 
but neither has drawn much narrative power 
from it. Beyond the capacity for storytell-
ing, the deepest challenge for the liberal 
powers is the actual content of the story put 
forward by China: a new space for action, 
and more specifically for the promotion of 
connectedness as a “value,” but a value that 
is barren of the moral attributes of inter-
national liberalism. 
Conclusion 
The geopolitics of connectivity is taking 
place in an international scene that is 
notably different from both the Cold War 
and post–Cold War periods. 
Whereas those periods were character-
ized by either bipolarization or an optimis-
tic “End of History” brand of globalization, 
the present period is marked by a lasting 
uncertainty, leading not to “a lack of order 
but rather a semi-ordered system.” The lat-
ter defines our current interregnum, which, 
in turn, has become the primary condition 
of international politics. Hence, the com-
petition of connectivity strategies does not 
place us, again, in a “new wine in old 
bottles” situation. Although connectedness 
is fundamental to human interaction, we 
somehow have not, in the West, formulated 
connectivity in political terms. In that sense, 
the Chinese politicization of connectivity 
is an important challenge, all the more so 
because it is unfolding in a global space 
that the interregnum has rendered remark-
ably malleable. 
This challenge takes further salience in 
the time of the Covid-19 pandemic, which 
underpins the need for universal access to 
today’s means of connectedness, and there-
fore a much more inclusive connectivity 
on a multiplicity of scales. Achieving such 
inclusiveness entails a reformulation of 
connectivity as a political value. Liberal 
powers, and the EU in particular, have a 
decisive role to play here. 
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The EU has entered rather recently the 
new geopolitical scene of competing con-
nectivity strategies by making a normative 
pledge that distinguishes it from the Chi-
nese approach and that of China’s partners. 
The content of this pledge is drawn from 
a well-established repertoire that has in-
formed European development strategies 
and foreign policy thus far. Breaking with its 
traditional soft – and not always vocal – 
approach to normative power, the EU is 
now making its values and rules-based 
stance explicit. This move bespeaks several 
challenges pertaining to Europe’s place in 
the world – and, beyond, to the way glob-
alization is articulated with international 
order. Although the connectivity strategy 
is not yet equipped with the appropriate 
financial resources – for instance, it is not 
said how (and if) the strategy will be inte-
grated in the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (2021–2027) – it represents a 
much needed European rules- and values-
based perspective of connectivity. Besides 
the question of financing, the success of the 
EU connectivity strategy lies in its ability to 
proactively shape a new, productive under-
standing of the “liberal” in the liberal inter-
national order. Shaping connectivity as a po-
litical value of Europe – similar to freedom, 
democracy, solidarity, rule of law, and mi-
nority rights – is thus a necessary first step. 
However, this needs a place of exchange 
where various European perspectives on 
connectivity can be discussed, an under-
standing of connectivity as a political value 
can be formed, and concrete steps for im-
plementation are decided. The installation 
of an Ambassador at Large for Connectivity 
in the European External Action Service 
is more of a representative gesture than a 
clear resource-rich commitment. At this 
point, two agencies need to be created: 
firstly, a decision-making body with a solid 
financial basis that is embedded in the 
EU bureaucratic framework, similar to a 
“Council for Connectivity Affairs”; secondly, 
a professional and permanent advisory 
body such as a “Virtual Hub on Connectivity 
Politics” that brings together scholars, think 
tanks, entrepreneurs, workers, industry 
associations, and political bureaucrats from 
various European countries. The Virtual 
Hub would entail at least two layers: one 
permanent expert platform and a broader 
network of advisors in which existing EU-
financed networks of expertise can be inte-
grated (e.g., the EU’s Asia-Pacific Research 
and Advice Network). 
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